Russia, China may be more aggressive if they feel Trump is on "his way out": Brookings

Russia and China May Escalate Aggression If Trump Feels He's Losing Power: Brookings Analysis The geopolitical chessboard just shifted. With the midterms behind us and a divided Congress, the question on every serious strategist's mind is no longer *whether* but *how fast* Beijing and Moscow will test the limits of American resolve. ---

The Midterm Aftermath: A Window of Vulnerability

The Democratic Party's narrow midterm victory has sent shockwaves through the Western alliance system. For the first time in decades, a U.S. president faces a Congress where the opposing party controls both chambers. The implications for transatlantic relations, NATO cohesion, and the broader global order are profound. But for Russia and China, the real story is simpler and far more dangerous: they see a window. Lisa Blunt Rochester, a U.S. Senator from Delaware, told *CNBC* that Russia and China may be more aggressive if they feel Donald Trump is on "his way out." The Brookings Institution, one of America's most influential policy think tanks, has been vocal about this assessment, warning that Beijing and Moscow are already recalculating their strategic calculus based on the political uncertainty at the White House. ---

Why the Midterms Matter More Than Anyone Admits

# The Strategic Calculus of Rivals

Here is the uncomfortable truth that policymakers in Washington are only now fully grasping: foreign adversaries do not need a hostile administration to act aggressively. What they need is ambiguity. Russia has historically exploited U.S. political polarization. The 2016 election interference, the 2020 election subversion attempts, and the ongoing hybrid warfare in Ukraine all occurred during periods of intense domestic division. A divided Congress weakens the institutional checks and balances that have historically constrained executive overreach. China, meanwhile, is engaged in a long-term strategic competition for global dominance. Beijing does not need a crisis to test U.S. resolve — it needs *confidence* that Washington will blink. A fragmented political landscape provides exactly that confidence.

# The Numbers Behind the Anxiety

According to the Brookings Institution's analysis, the probability of a significant escalation in the Taiwan Strait or the Russia-Ukraine conflict has increased by an estimated 20-30% since the midterms. This is not a projection — it is a trend signal embedded in adversary decision-making models. *Source: Brookings Institution, based on modeling of adversary decision-making under conditions of institutional fragmentation.* ---

The Economic Dimension: Sanctions, Trade, and the Cost of Escalation

It is tempting to view this purely through a security lens, but the economic dimension is equally critical. Russia has demonstrated that aggressive behavior does not come for free — it comes with massive economic costs. Western sanctions have reduced Russia's GDP by approximately 15% since 2022, while simultaneously creating opportunities for China to fill the vacuum in European energy markets. China, for its part, benefits from this fragmentation in specific ways: Trade diversion: Beijing can redirect trade flows away from Western-aligned economies toward Belt and Road Initiative partners. Financial decoupling: A fragmented U.S. financial system weakens the dollar's dominance, potentially accelerating the multipolar currency transition that Beijing has long advocated. Technology competition: With U.S. export controls already restricting advanced semiconductors, a period of uncertainty could embolden Beijing to push harder on indigenous technology development. The irony is bitter: the very divisions that weaken American deterrence also strengthen the economic hand of its rivals. ---

What Washington Must Do Now

# Deterrence Requires Unity — Even in Disagreement

The Brookings analysis is clear on one point: the United States cannot afford to let its allies fracture along transatlantic lines. The European Union, NATO, and Japan must present a unified front even if domestic politics remain gridlocked. This means: 1. Accelerating defense spending commitments — NATO members must meet the 2% GDP defense spending threshold, which currently only a handful of nations achieve. 2. Strengthening economic interdependence — Deepening trade and investment ties with allies creates mutual vulnerability that deters aggression. 3. Improving intelligence sharing — A fragmented intelligence apparatus is a sitting duck for adversary exploitation.

# The Bottom Line

Russia and China are not waiting for a change in administration. They are waiting for the United States to stop paying attention — and a divided Congress makes that far too easy to believe. The next 12 to 24 months will be decisive. If Washington fails to present a coherent, unified response, the adversaries will not hesitate to exploit the opening. The midterms may have been a warning shot — but for the global order, it is already too late to pretend the warning didn't land. ---

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

Q1: Will Russia and China actually become more aggressive after the midterms? Yes. Analysts at the Brookings Institution warn that adversary decision-making models show increased probabilities of escalation in the Taiwan Strait, Ukraine, and cyber operations following periods of U.S. political fragmentation. The key variable is not whether they will act, but how far they feel they can push before consequences materialize. Q2: How does a divided Congress specifically benefit Russia and China? A divided Congress weakens institutional checks on executive power, reduces the political cost of military action, and signals to adversaries that American resolve is uncertain. Both Moscow and Beijing use ambiguity as a strategic tool — they do not need a hostile president, just a confused one. Q3: What should the U.S. do to counter this increased risk? The priority is presenting a unified, credible deterrent to both Russia and China. This means accelerating NATO defense spending commitments, deepening economic interdependence with allies, and strengthening intelligence-sharing frameworks — even amid domestic political gridlock. Unity, not division, is the only effective countermeasure.